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Abstract—We describe a system, PEP3, for storage and re-
trieval of IP flow information (equivalent to IPFIX/NetFlow)
in which the IP addresses are replaced by pseudonyms. Every
eligible party gets its own set of pseudonyms. A single entity,
the transcryptor, that is composed of five independent peers,
is responsible for the generation of, depseudonymisation of,
and translation between different sets of pseudonyms. These
operations can be performed by any three of the five peers,
preventing a single point of trust or failure. Using homomorphic
aspects of ElGamal encryption the peers perform their operations
on encrypted –and potentially– pseudonymised IP addresses
only, thereby never learning the (pseudonymised) IP addresses
handled by the parties. Moreover, using Schnorr type proofs,
the behaviour of the peers can be verified, without revealing the
(pseudonymised) IP addresses either. Hence the peers are central,
but need not be fully trusted. The design of our system, while
easily modified to other settings, is tuned to the sheer volume of
data presented by IP flow information.
Index Terms—Network Flows, Polymorphic Encryption and
Pseudonymisation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of network flow monitoring is well known and
widely deployed by network operators. The aggregation of
packets passing through a certain point in the network into
flow records (often based on the 5-tuple) allows for higher-
level reasoning, and moreover, it proves to be a scalable way
of measuring high quantities of network traffic.
The payload of the packets, and thus the contents of the
communication itself, is discarded in this aggregation process:
a flow usually only contains the number of packets and bytes
that were observed, the start and end time of that flow, and
the 5-tuple it was aggregated on.
Most routers commonly deployed by network operators can
perform this flow aggregation, and export the flow statistics
(often using either Cisco’s NetFlow [1], or IPFIX [2], an IETF
standard) towards a collector. The collector then stores, with a
certain retention time, the received flow records either on disk
or in a database, which allows the operator to query the data.
Even without the actual payload, flow measurements contain
sufficient information for a plethora of use cases, such as
keeping traffic statistics for network operators, large-scale
This work is part of the research programme VWData with project number
400.17.605, which is (partly) financed by the Netherlands Organisation for
Scientific Research (NWO).
measurement studies for researchers, or forensic activities by
security teams. On the flip side flow information may reveal
very sensitive information, despite not containing the actual
contents of the communication. Consider for example the IP
address of a server hosting only one website, about a rare
disease. Or consider a server that hosts many different videos;
the duration and size of the flow generated by a viewing of a
video might betray which video was watched. On top of this
an IP address can constitute personal data under the GDPR.
Appreciating that flow information is both of great use
and a potential risk, we propose to reduce this risk without
sacrificing too much usability by replacing the IP address
in the flow data by pseudonyms, and, moreover, to use a
unique set of pseudonyms for every eligible party (storage
facility, researcher, investigator, etc., further explained in
Section II-B). This might be achieved by (deterministically
and symmetrically) encrypting IP addresses destined for a
certain party by a secret key unique to—but not shared with—
that party. We hold that the transcryptor, the entity that keeps
these secret keys, and is thus responsible for generating and
translating the pseudonyms,
1) should not learn the IP addresses it processes for the
parties;
2) should not have a single point of failure; and
3) should be verifiable.
In this paper we describe PEP3, a system that fulfils these
requirements by:1
1) having the transcryptor deal with encrypted pseudonyms
only, and leveraging homomorphic aspects of
ElGamal[4] encryption, noted earlier in [3] (and
arguably [5], [6]), to perform the required operations
on these encrypted pseudonyms;
2) breaking the central secret keys held by the transcryp-
tor into ten shares each, and dividing those shares
over five independent peers—which together form the
transcryptor—in such a way that every triple of peers,
but no pair, together has all ten shares; and
1The name “PEP3” is a contraction of “PEP” the precursor to this
system, [3], and “P3”, our project’s designation within the VWData research
programme.
3) verifying the honesty of the peers by (occasionally
retroactively) requiring a Schnorr type proof (see
Section III-B) for the performed operation.
We envision that an organisation wishing to run PEP3 would
collaborate with multiple (up to five) independent and possibly
geographically diverse hosting providers to run the peers, and
would arrange by contract that the shares are not disclosed,
even to the network operator itself.
In the design of any complex system there are a lot of knobs
to turn, and dials to watch. We do not pretend that our system
is optimal, nor that we have defined what optimal should mean
in this context. We have, however, preferred simplicity and
speed over cleverness and additional features. Where possi-
ble, we have chosen tried and trusted cryptographic systems
(curve25519, ElGamal encryption, Schnorr type proofs) over
exciting new techniques (such as pairing based cryptography).
We have also carefully avoided the need for peers to store any
additional information after a setup phase, reducing the need
for locking, and dangers of filling volumes.
a) Contributions: PEP3 builds on the PEP system[3]
designed to store medical research data. Our system differs
in several ways from PEP (see Section IV-C), most notably in
that we divide the three different roles (transcryptor, access
manager, key server) in PEP over five peers. The general
idea of splitting a global secret into shares, and dividing it
over several peers, so that only a subset of them is needed
to perform the action, is well-known[7] and fundamental to
fields such as threshold cryptography and secure multiparty
computation, as is the use of Schnorr-type proofs in this
context. Our contribution lies primarily in finding a combi-
nation that fits our application. Nonetheless, the derivation
scheme discussed in III-C and the “lizard” encoding scheme
from IV-A appear to be technical novelties. We believe that
the security, privacy, verifiability, and especially the simplicity
offered by our combination may certainly find application to
other situations as well.
b) Demonstrator: An interactive demonstration of
the most important features of PEP3 can be found at
https://vwdata-p3.github.io/demo.html. Its source code is
available at https://github.com/vwdata-p3/webdemo.
c) This paper is organised as follows: In Section II we
describe the basic functioning of the transcryptor as a single
entity, and then built it from five peers in Section III. In
Section IV we address final points by discussing technical
problems, describe how this work fits in with the GDPR
and related academic works, and spend some words on the
performance of our prototype. Finally, we conclude the paper
in Section VI.
II. TRANSCRYPTOR
A. Polymorphic Encryption and Pseudonymisation
a) The group: We base PEP3 on curve25519, an elliptic
curve introduced by Daniel Bernstein in [8], and named after
the prime p := 2255 − 19, because it is both fast, and has
stood up to the scrutiny caused by its popularity. Using Mike
Hamburg’s decaf-technique[9] curve25519 gives rise to the
ristretto255[10], [11] group G, a special way to represent the
cyclic group Z/ℓZ of integers modulo the prime
ℓ := 2252 + 27,742,317,777,372,353,535,851,937,790,883,648,493.
Although Z/ℓZ and G are isomorphic as groups, the number 1
of Z/ℓZ being send to a specific non-zero base point B, there
is no known efficient algorithm to find given an element A
from G the unique number n of Z/ℓZ with nB = A.
In other words, the discrete log problem is difficult in G.
We also assume it to be hard to solve the more difficult
decisional Diffie–Hellman problem (see [12]) in G, that is,
to determine whether a triplet (A,M,N) of elements of G
is a so-called Diffie–Hellman triplet, that is, whether writing
(A,M,N) ≡ (aB,mB, nB) we have am = n. We will
see that such hardness assumptions can be used to show
that cryptosystems based on G are resistant to several simple
attacks. The actual security provided by these cryptosystems
is, however, much more difficult to capture formally, see
Section 3 “Security” of [8], introducing curve25519 for a
detailed discussion.
b) IP addresses: For now we will represent an IP address
by a non-zero element A of the group G. We will show
in Section IV-A how to encode 128 bit IP addresses (thus
supporting both IPv6 and IPv4) as elements of G.
c) ElGamal Encryption: For the encryption of IP ad-
dresses we use the following scheme based on [4]. For any
scalar r ∈ Z/ℓZ the triple
( rB, M + rsB, sB )
represents the encryption of a message M ∈ G for the
private key s ∈ Z/ℓZ. The public key associated with s is the
element sB of G. In general, a cyphertext is a triple (β, γ, τ)
of elements of G, where β is the blinding, γ is the core,
and τ is the target.2 To encrypt a message M ∈ G for a
public key τ ∈ G, one picks a random scalar r ∈ Z/ℓZ, and
computes
E (M, τ, r) := ( rB, M + rτ, τ ). (1)
To decrypt a cyphertext (β, γ, τ) using a private key s ∈ Z/ℓZ
one computes
D( (β, γ, τ), s ) := γ − sβ. (2)
Note that D(E (M, τ, r), s) = M + r(τ − sB) equals M
when τ = sB. On the other hand, if τ 6= sB, and r is chosen
randomly, D(E (M, τ, r), s) could be any element of G.
Note also that a triple (β, γ, τ) is the cyphertext of some
message M if and only if (β, τ, γ −M) is a Diffie–Hellman
triplet. Conversely, a triplet (A,M,N) ∈ G3 is a Diffie–
Hellman triplet iff (A,N,M) = E (0,M, r) for some r ∈
Z/ℓZ. So deciding whether a triple (β, γ, τ) is the cyphertext
for some message M (without additional information such as
the secret key) is thus just as difficult as the decisional Diffie–
Hellman problem. Decrypting a cyphertext without additional
2We include the target τ in the cyphertext so that we can define the
rerandomisation operation, Rr , below.
information such as a guess for the plaintext might be even
harder.
d) Pseudonyms: A pseudonym for an IP address repre-
sented by a non-zero group element A ∈ G is simply nA,
where n ∈ Z/ℓZ is a scalar called the pseudonym key. Note
that depending on the pseudonym key, the pseudonym for A
could be any element of G.
In PEP3, the transcryptor keeps track of an encryption key
sP and a pseudonym key nP , both non-zero scalars from Z/ℓZ,
for every party P . The encryption key sP is shared with P ,
while the transcryptor keeps nP to herself. The pseudonym
for P of an IP address A ∈ G is then nPA, and an encrypted
pseudonym for P of A is a triple of the form (rB, nPA +
rsPB, sPB) ≡ E (nPA, sPB, r) for some scalar r ∈ Z/ℓZ.
e) Translation: The transcryptor has the following three
elementary operations on cyphertexts at her disposal, where
s, n, r ∈ Z/ℓZ, cf. [3].
rekeying: Ks(β, γ, τ) := ( s
−1β, γ, sτ )
reshuffling: Sn(β, γ, τ) := (nβ, nγ, τ )
rerandomisation: Rr(β, γ, τ) := (β + rB, γ + rτ, τ )
To translate an encrypted pseudonym for party P to an
encrypted pseudonym for party Q, the transcryptor applies
KsQs
−1
P
SnQn
−1
P
Rr′ ,
where r′ is some random scalar from Z/ℓZ. Note that KsQs−1P
changes the target of the encryption, sending E (M, sPB, r)
to E (M, sQB, sP s
−1
Q r), while SnQn−1P changes the target of
pseudonyms, sending E (nPM, τ, r) to E (nQM, τ, nQn
−1
P r).
The purpose of Rr′ is more technical, and threefold. To
begin, it prevents spoofing of the target in the cyphertext:
if the triple (rB,M + rsB, s′B), which pretends to be a
cyphertext intended for s′B, but is actually decryptable by sB,
is rerandomised, the result ( (r+r′)B, M+rsB+r′s′B, s′B )
does not revealM to someone not knowing s′. It also prevents
a party P from obtaining the unencrypted pseudonym for Q of
an IP address A by sending (0, nPA, sPB) to the transcryptor
for translation from P to Q. Finally, it makes the translation
operation non-deterministic, reducing the risk of linkability.
f) (De)pseudonymisation: To translate a for party P
encrypted IP address to a for party Q encrypted pseudonym,
the transcryptor applies KsQs−1P SnQ Rr′ , where r
′ is some
random scalar. Depseudonymisation is performed similarly.
g) Polymorphism and homomorphism: The (ElGamal)
encryption scheme we use is ‘polymorphic’ in the sense that
a message encrypted for one party can be rekeyed to be de-
cryptable by another party (without the need for intermediate
decryption). Pseudonymisation is polymorphic in a similar
sense.
The fact that the translation between pseudonyms can be
performed on cyphertext makes the encryption ‘homomorphic’
with respect to this translation operation. At this point the tran-
scryptor, knowing the secret keys of the parties, can sidestep
the polymorphism and homomorphism by first decrypting,
then translating, and finally encrypting again. However, when
the transcryptor is split into five peers in the next section,
this trick is no longer possible, and the advantage of the
polymorphic and homomorphic aspects of the encryption
become clear.
B. Parties
Before we explain the way the transcryptor is built (from
five peers), we will sketch how we intend her services be used
by the different parties.
a) Metering and storage: The two most basic parties to
PEP3 are the metering process (MP) generating flow records,
and the storage facility (SF) storing the flow records. Recall
that both parties get their own encryption keys sMP and
sSF from the transcryptor, respectively. After the metering
process has produced a batch of flow records aggregated from
packets going over the network, it encrypts the associated IP
addresses in these flow records using its own encryption key,
sMP, and sends them to the transcryptor for translation to
encrypted pseudonyms for sSF, which the transcryptor returns
to the metering process. The metering process replaces the IP
addresses in the flow records by these encrypted pseudonyms,
and sends them along to the storage facility. Note that the
metering process does not learn the pseudonyms for the
storage facility, since they are returned by the transcryptor
to the metering process encrypted for the storage facility’s
key, sSF. The storage facility, having received and decrypted
the encrypted pseudonyms in the flow records, stores the
pseudonymised flow records in its database.
b) Retrieval: A party wishing to consult the records held
by the storage facility may form a query in terms of their
own set of pseudonyms, and then replace their pseudonyms by
corresponding encrypted pseudonyms for the storage facility
obtained from the transcryptor. Having received and performed
the query, the storage facility returns the result, but only after
having encrypted the pseudonyms (from the storage facility’s
set) with its encryption key, sSF. Having received the flow
record with encrypted IP addresses, the querying party consults
the transcryptor again, this time to translate the encrypted
pseudonyms from the storage facility’s set to its own set.
c) Queries: Clearly not every type of query should
be allowed by the storage facility lest it runs the risk of
revealing (information about) its pseudonyms. This could not
only happen directly via a comparison between a pseudonym
and a plain string, but also by allowing, for example, an
ORDER BY on a pseudonymised column. We think a practical
solution would be to select a very minimal subset of SQL
such that given the information about which columns and
parameters are pseudonyms (and which are just plain values)
the storage facility can easily annotate each expression in the
query with either “pseudonym” or “plain value”. Instead of
listing which operations on pseudonyms are inadmissible, the
storage facility should instead keep a list of which operations
and expressions involving pseudonyms are admissible. For
example: comparing a pseudonym with another pseudonym
using == is admissible, and applying COUNT to a pseudonym
ABE ABC BCD CDE ADE
ACD BDE ACE ABD BCE
Fig. 1. The ten triples of peers, visualised as triangles.
is admissible, and SELECTing a pseudonym is admissible, and
nothing more.
d) Authorisation: To prevent free translation between
pseudonyms and IP addresses (defeating the pseudonymi-
sation) a specific permit (signed by some predetermined
certification authority) could be required by the tran-
scryptor for a party wishing to perform a translation or
(de)pseudonymisation. For example, the metering process only
could be given a personal permit to pseudonymise into storage
facility pseudonyms. A party wishing to retrieve records from
the storage facility, such as a researcher, would need a permit
to translate pseudonyms from its own set to the set of the
storage facility (and back). Note that if such a researcher
was to collude with the metering process, they could link IP
addresses with their own pseudonyms.
e) Depseudonymisation warrant: A party should never
be given a blanket permit for depseudonymisation. Instead we
envision that, say, an investigator would obtain a permit to
depseudonymise a specific (encrypted) pseudonym from the
relevant authority, after having presenting sufficient proof to
warrant this.
III. FIVE PEERS
A. Ten Shares
In PEP3, the transcryptor is split into five peers, named A,
B, C, D, and E. As a general rule, three out of five peers should
be able to act as transcryptor. To this end, each pseudonym
key nP for a party P , is defined to be a product
nP ≡ n
ABE
P n
ABC
P n
BCD
P n
CDE
P n
ADE
P n
ACD
P n
BDE
P n
ACE
P n
ABD
P n
BCE
P
of 10 ≡
(
5
3
)
shares, one for each triple of peers. Of course, the
share nABEP is given to the peers A, B, and E, and so on. Note
that no two peers (such as D and E) have access to all shares
(D and E do not have the share of ABC.) However, every
triple does have access to all shares, because any two triples
drawn from five peers must have at least one peer in common.
The encryption key sP for a party P is split similarly into ten
shares. For brevity’s sake, let
T := {ABE,ABC, BCD, CDE, ADE,
ACD, BDE, ACE, ABD, BCE }
denote the set of all ten triples of peers.
a) Translation: An encrypted pseudonym for a party P
can be translated to an encrypted pseudonym for party Q by
applying the operations
KsTQ(s
T
P )
−1 SnTQ(n
T
P )
−1 RrT , (3)
where rT is a random scalar, and T ranges over T , in
sequence. The order in which these operations are performed
does affect the (random component of the) cyphertext, but not
the resulting pseudonym (if the input was valid). Naturally, any
of the three peers in the triple T can perform the operation
in (3).
A translation can also be performed by three operations
instead of ten, as follows. Choose three peers, say A, C, and D,
and split the triples among them, by, say,
TA := {ABE, ABC, ADE, ACD, ACE, ABD }
TC := {BCD, CDE, BCE }
TD := {BDE }.
Then define, for each X ∈ {A,C,D},
nXP :=
∏
T∈TX
nTP and s
X
P :=
∏
T∈TX
sTP ,
and have A, C, and D perform the operations
KsXQ (s
X
P )
−1 SnTQ(n
X
P )
−1 RrX ,
for all three X ∈ {A,C,D}, in sequence, on the encrypted
pseudonym for P .
(De)pseudonymisation can be performed by three peers in
a similar fashion.
b) Alternative constellations: Our choice to divide the
secrets of the transcryptor over the triples drawn from five
peers is to some extend arbitrary. We could instead have
chosen a system where the secrets are, for example, shared
among pairs drawn from three peers (which is not resistant
against collusion of two peers.) Another option is to break the
symmetry between peers by giving a particularly important
peer its own share, forcing its involvement in any operation
of the transcryptor.
B. Verification
Note that if one peer is offline, the transcryptor still
functions. Nevertheless, a single peer can presently disrupt
the system in another way, by producing erroneous results,
possibly without being detected. One might argue that it is
possible to prevent this by having multiple peers perform the
same operation, and compare the results. This comparison
is, however, complicated by the random component in the
encryption. We propose a different method of verifying the
peers’ operations, namely by having the peers attach non-
interactive[13] Schnorr type[14] proofs of correctness to their
results. To keeps things simple we create these proof from the
following basic building block.
1) Certified Diffie–Hellman triplets: Recall that it is con-
sidered infeasible in general to determine whether a triplet
(A,M,N) of group elements of G is a Diffie–Hellman triplet,
that is, whether writing (A,M,N) ≡ (aB,mB, nB) we
have am = n. If the scalar a is known, however, the
matter is easily settled by checking whether aM = N . We
will describe a method by which a prover knowing a can
prove to a verifier that (A,M,N) is a Diffie–Hellman triplet,
without revealing a, using two group elements RM , RB ,
and one scalar s. We will say that (A,M,N) is certified
by (RM , RB, s).
a) Creating the proof (RM , RB , s): The prover picks a
random scalar r ∈ Z/ℓZ, and defines RB := rB, RM := rM ,
and s := r + ha, where h := Hash(A,M,N,RM , RB) for
some appropriate predetermined hash function Hash: G5 →
Z/ℓZ.
b) To verify a proof (RM , RB, s): for the alleged Diffie–
Hellman triplet (A,M,N), the verifier computes h :=
Hash(A,M,N,RM , RB), and checks whether
sB = RB + hA and sM = RM + hN. (4)
c) Infeasibility of fraud: To deceive the verifier into be-
lieving a triplet (A,M,N) is a Diffie–Hellman triplet verified
by (RM , RB, s) a deceiver needs to solve the two equations
in (4). Since the value of the hash h changes erratically
depending on its inputs, it might as well be any scalar as far as
the deceiver is concerned. Solving (4) can thus be considered
a game, in which the deceiver first chooses A, M , N , RM ,
RB , then gets a random h as challenge, and must finally pick s
such that the two equations in (4) hold. Having chosen A, M ,
N , RM , RB , the deceiver has a winning strategy if and only if
she has a function s : Z/ℓZ→ Z/ℓZ with, for all h ∈ Z/ℓZ,
s(h)B = RB + hA and s(h)M = RM + hN. (5)
Taking h = 0, we see that
s(0)B = RB and s(0)M = RM .
Substituting this result back into (5) gives, after rearrangement,
for all h 6= 0,
s(h)− s(0)
h
B = A and
s(h)− s(0)
h
M = N.
Hence (A,M,N) is indeed a Diffie–Hellman triplet.
d) Acknowledgement: The certified Diffie–Hellman
triplets are essentially the same as the non-interactive version
of the EQ-composition of Schnorr’s protocol in Figure 5.7
of [15].
2) Certifying KsSnRr: Such certified Diffie–Hellman
triplets can be used by a peer wishing to show to a party (via
a non-interactive Schnorr type proof) that a triple (β′, γ′, τ ′)
is the result of performing the operation KsSnRr on a triple
(β, γ, τ), that is, that
(β′, γ′, τ ′) = (ns−1(β + rB), n(γ + rτ), sτ )
≡ KsSnRr(β, γ, τ).
Indeed, the peer would need only certify the five Diffie–
Hellman triplets
( ns−1B, β + rB, β′ ), ( nB, γ + rτ, γ′ ), (sB, τ, τ ′),
( sB, ns−1B, nB ), and (rB, τ, rτ).
It’s assumed here that the party can know what sB and nB
should be. If, as in the case of translation of a pseudonym,
s is a composite, such as s ≡ sTP (s
T
Q)
−1, then additional
proof must be provided for this to the peer, for instance a
certified Diffie–Hellman triplet ( sTP (s
T
Q)
−1B, sTQB, s
T
PB ) in
our example.
3) Random sampling: Having peers attach proofs to all
their operations comes at the cost of more than doubling the
number of (computationally expensive) scalar multiplications
required. This problem can be addressed by having the parties
not always request a proof of the peers, but randomly with a
probability, e.g., 1%. The request for a proof should be put to
the peer as a follow-up question, after the operation’s result
has already been received by the party, lest the peer knows
when to behave properly, and when it need not.
To produce such a proof after the fact, the peer either
needs to remember the random scalars it used, or better,
hand the random scalar to the peer (in a for the peer’s eyes
only encrypted package) to be returned to the peer upon a
request for proof. It should, of course, be possible for a party
to resubmit its request for a proof to a peer in case of an
unexpected connection loss. The encrypted package should, of
course, be tied to the operation (perhaps by including a hash
of the original operation in the encrypted package) to prevent
the peer from being tricked into using the random scalar in
unrelated operations.
Note that a dishonest peer might be willing to risk detection
by random sampling if its objective would be to disrupt only a
single operation involving a specific IP address. However, the
peer can not target a specific IP address, even if it knew its
cyphertext, due to the rerandomisation. At best, the peer can
try to target a specific IP address using side-channels such as
the time, and size of the request, forcing it, perhaps, to cast a
larger net, and increase its risk of detection.
4) Authorisation (for depseudonymisation): To check
whether a party is authorised to have a certain operation
performed, a peer can often simply demand a permit, and
check it. There is, however, an interesting complication when
the permit pertains to a specific encrypted pseudonym, say, to
depseudonymise it. Surely, the first peer contacted by the party
can check the permit. The second peer, however, being handed
the partially depseudonymised encrypted pseudonym returned
by the first peer, has no way of telling whether this partial
result is related to the encrypted pseudonym mentioned in the
permit. This problem is solved by requesting the first peer to
attach a proof to its result, which the party can pass along to
the second peer. Continuing in a similar fashion, we end up
with a chain of partial results and attached proofs, that starts
with the encrypted pseudonym mentioned in the warrant, and
ends with the associated encrypted plain IP address.
C. Derivation of pseudonym and encryption keys
A triple T of peers derives the pseudonym key nTP and
encryption key sTP for a party P from a master pseudonym
key nT , and a master encryption key sT , respectively. We
thereby circumvent the troubles of having to generate, store
and synchronise keys sTP and n
T
P for every new party P , on
demand. The keys are derived as follows: assuming that each
party P has some unique identifier idP from some set I, and
given a hash function H : I → Z/(ℓ − 1)Z, we set
nTP := (n
T )H(idP ) and sTP := (s
T )H(idP ).
We derive the keys in this particular manner in order to make
it possible for a peer to give proof that nTPB was derived
from nTB, using the 253 group elements
nTB, (nT )2B, (nT )4B, . . . , (nT )2
252
B,
by, writing H(idP ) =
∑n
k=1 2
ik where 0 ≤ i1 < i2 < · · · <
in ≤ 252, certifying the Diffie–Hellman triplets
( (nT )2
i1
B, (nT )2
i2
B, (nT )2
i1+2i2B )
( (nT )2
i1+2i2B, (nT )2
i3
B, (nT )2
i1+2i2+2i3B )
...
( (nT )2
i1+···+2in−1B, (nT )2
in
B, nTPB ).
Such a proof for nTPB is needed by peers and parties wishing
to check a proof (from Section III-B) in which nTPB appears.
Any party Q should be able to request such a proof for nTPB
from a peer in the triple T . In particular, the party P can
pass along a proof of nTPB to a peer not in T needing proof
of nTPB to verify, for example, a depseudonymisation request.
In this way, the peer does not need to contact the other peers.
Regarding the security of this derivation scheme: we
conjecture that recovering nT from the group elements
(nT )2
0
B, . . . , (nT )2
252
B is essentially as difficult as com-
puting the discrete log for one of 253 random group elements.
D. Setup and enrolment
We assume that the peers and parties can authenticate one
another and communicate securely, e.g., by using TLS and
certificates.
a) Setup: To start PEP3 each triple T of peers needs
to decide on secrets nT and sT , and the public parts nTB,
(nT )2B, . . . and sTB, (sT )2B, . . . need to be shared with the
other peers. The secret nABC might be generated, for example,
by first having each of the pairs AB, BC, AC use Diffie–
Hellman key exchange to decide on secrets nAB, nBC, nAC,
and then define nABC := nAB nBC nAC. Of course, B and C
would both need to transmit nBC to A, and A should check
the missives agree, and so on. At this stage, any peer can
anonymously disrupt the system by sending incorrect key
material around. It would be preferable that dishonest action of
a peer during setup would be identifiable by the other peers,
and we see devising a scheme providing such safeguard as
a possible improvement to our system. A perhaps simpler
solution is to have each pair of peers compare the public parts
they obtained, and abort when any inconsistencies are found.
b) Enrolment: The situation for adding a party P to
the system, so-called enrolment, does not have the problem
described in the setup phase. The party P simply requests the
public keys nTB, (nT )2B, . . . and sTB, (sT )2B, . . . from
every peer, and the secret sTP from every peer in the triple T ,
with proof for sTPB from s
TB, (sT )2B, . . . . If two peers in
a triple send incorrect values for sTP , then if the other three
peers are honest, P can detect the correct value for sTP , and
thus which peers were dishonest, by following the majority’s
claim for the value of sTB, (sT )2B, . . . .
IV. FINAL POINTS
A. Encoding IP addresses
One technical problem we encountered when using the
ristretto255 group G was the lack of a direct way to encode a
128 bit piece of data w (such as an IPv6 or IPv4 address) as an
element w of G in such a way that the data w can cheaply be
recovered from w. Such an encoding is useful for encryptingw
using the ElGamal scheme described in Section II-A.
The other direction presents no problem: there is a canonical
and reversible way to encode an element of G as a 32-byte
string, but only ℓ/2256 ≈ 6.25% of all 32-bytes strings are a
valid encoding of an element from G. So what is usually done
(circumventing the need to encode a message as group element
before encrypting it) is to pick a random group element and
use its 32-byte encoding to encrypt the message symmetrically.
This solution is not viable for our system, because reran-
domisation and reshuffling cannot be applied to the symmetric
cyphertext. Instead we would like to use elligator 2[16], which
does give a reversible map ell2 : Z/pZ −→ G, but each
element of G can have up to 16 preimages under ell2.
Since ell2(x) = ell2(−x) we can discard half the preimages
by considering only the elements of Z/pZ whose minimal
positive representative is even.
Thus the map ell2′ : {0, 1}253 → G defined by
ell2
′(b1 · · · b253) := ell2( b12
1 + b22
2 + · · ·+ b2532
253 )
is reversible, and the preimage ell2′
−1
(A) of an element A ∈
G has at most 8 elements. Now, define lizard : {0, 1}128 → G
by 3
lizard(b1 · · · b128) := ell2
′(b1 · · · b128h1 · · ·h125),
where h1 · · ·h125 are the first 125 bits of the SHA-256
hash of b1 · · · b128. Then lizard is easily computable, and
reversible, and, the preimage lizard(A) of an element A ∈ G
almost always contains at most 1 element. Indeed, assuming
that the bits of a word w in the preimage ell2′(A) are
distributed randomly, the chance that the last 125 bits of
such a word match the first 125 bits of the SHA-256 of w
should be 12125 . Thus the chance that given w ∈ {0, 1}
128
the preimage lizard−1(lizard(w)) contains only w is at least
(1 − 12125 )
7. So even if 1010 computers would apply lizard
3Implementations of (a trivial variation on) lizard can be found
on https://github.com/vwdata-p3/webdemo/blob/master/ed25519.py and
https://github.com/bwesterb/go-ristretto/blob/master/ristretto.go.
to 1010 unique IP addresses per second for 300 years (≈ 1010
seconds), all ≈ 2100 IP addresses will map to a group
element with a unique preimage with probability of at least
(1− 12125 )
7·2100 ≥ 1− 7 · 2100 · 12125 ≥ 1−
1
221 ≥
999,999
1,000,000 .
B. GDPR and pseudonymisation
Some remarks regarding the effects of the GDPR on our
proposal are in order.
a) IP addresses as personal data: According to the
GDPR[17], personal data is any information that can identify
a natural person, either directly or indirectly, see article 4(1)
(of the GDPR). This means that not only the full name of a
natural person, but also just an IP address he or she used may
constitute personal data. In fact, IP addresses are explicitly
mentioned as potential identifiers in recital 30 (of the GDPR).
Moreover, the European Court of Justice has decided that a
dynamic IP address used by a natural person to visit a website
constitutes personal data for the website operator provided
the ISP has additional data needed to identify the user by
the dynamic IP address, and the provider of the website has
the legal means to obtain this additional data[18]. It is thus
advisable for a network operator to treat any IP address as
potential personal data.
b) Consent: Perhaps contrary to popular belief process-
ing of personal data does not necessarily require consent of
the data subject. Consent is just one of six potential grounds
for lawful processing provided in article 6.1. One of the other
grounds is that the processing is necessary for a legitimate
interest of the data controller. In fact, recital 49 mentions
explicitly (but with qualifications) that processing of personal
data for the purposes of network and information security
constitutes a legitimate interest. It is not clear, however,
whether this ground would cover processing of flow data for
research, but it is not ruled out (in the context of clinical
trails) in point 14 of an opinion, [19], of the European
Data Protection Board. Moreover, the Dutch research network
operator SURFnet considers requests from researchers for
using some of its flow records for research, albeit on a case-
by-case basis, and under strict conditions, see [20].
c) Pseudonymisation: Pseudonymised personal data is
still personal data, according to recital 26. Pseudonymisation
is thus not a tool to circumvent the processing of personal data,
and the associated legal restrictions. Instead, pseudonymisation
is a technique that according to article 25.1 must be considered
by any data controller to meet its obligation to implement data-
protection principles such as data minimisation, article 5.1(c).
It is not unthinkable that if flow data can be stored and used in
pseudonymised form, it therefore must be, under the GDPR.
C. Related work
1) PEP: As already mentioned, PEP3 is based on PEP, see
https://pep.cs.ru.nl and [3], which applies similar techniques
to store personal medical data encrypted and pseudonymised.
One of the main selling points of PEP is that the data subjects
can control which parties get access to their medical data.
PEP3, on the other hand, is more oriented towards helping
network operators fulfil their data protection obligations.
One important feature of PEP—not needed and thus not
included in PEP3—is the ability to store (medical) data (such
as MRI scans) in polymorphically encrypted form. Indeed,
if we were to store, say, the source and destination ports in
encrypted form within the database of the storage facility,4 we
could no longer use them in queries, hampering the usability
of the flow records.
While PEP and PEP3 are closely related, conceptually PEP
is more intricate. The core functions of PEP are performed
by three entities: the transcryptor, the access manager, and the
key server. In PEP an encryption key sP for a party P is of
the form sP ≡ k
AM
P k
T
Px, where k
AM
P and k
T
P are secrets that
depend on P , and are known only by the access manager, and
transcryptor, respectively, while x is a secret known only to
the key server and does not depend on P .
To enrol in PEP, a party P contacts the key server and access
manager, but not the transcryptor; the transcryptor is contacted
by the access manager on the party’s behalf. The key server
does not send x to P directly, because it is important that x
is kept a secret. For the same reason the access manager can
not relay kAMP k
T
P to the party P for enrolment, because with
kAMP k
T
P and sP the party P could compute x. Therefore the
clever scheme depicted in Figure 2.3 of [3] is needed to enrol
a party. From the PEP3 viewpoint one can think of x as the
encryption key of a “generic party” G, so x = sG and k
AM
G =
kTG = 1. The reason that it is important that x ≡ sG is kept
a secret is that when party makes a request to PEP involving
a data subject identifier, this identifier is encrypted not for
the party’s encryption key sP , but instead for G’s encryption
key sG ≡ x. The resulting cyphertext is called a polymorphic
pseudonym, an important concept in PEP, avoided in PEP3.
In PEP, the access manager acts as the gatekeeper: all
queries intended for the storage facility are put directly to
the access manager. This makes a more fine-grained access
control possible in PEP than in PEP3, where the peers do not
learn which queries they facilitate. This is the general trend:
PEP3 sacrifices features of PEP for the sake of simplicity.
The main improvement of PEP3 over PEP is the splitting of
the secrets into shares, and the addition of Schnorr type proofs,
preventing PEP3 from malfunctioning (after setup) even if two
of the five peers misbehave.
2) Other related work: The rekeying of ElGamal cypher-
text has appeared before under the name atomic proxy re-
encryption, in [5].
Camenisch and Lehmann[6], [21] propose a pseudonym
system that appears rather similar to ours from a high-
level viewpoint, involving a converter (≈transcryptor), server
(≈party) specific pseudonyms, and exploiting homomorphic
aspects of ElGamal as well. Their system is, however, much
more advanced, employing, for example, pairing based cryp-
tography, and being verified by formal security models. Their
4In spite of that, or even exactly because of it, the database should be
stored on an encrypted disk, and flow records should be transmitted through
encrypted channels.
focus is currently[21] on making the system user-auditable,
having as use case governmental databases in mind; our
focus is on making a robust and fast transcryptor. Under
the hood their converter functions quite differently from our
transcryptor: the converter consists of a single entity (instead
of five peers), generates pseudonyms randomly (instead of
deterministically deriving them from secrets, as PEP3 does,)
and needs to keep records on all the pseudonyms it previously
generated. The last point might be problematic when trying
to apply their system to our use case of storing internet flow
data, due to the large number of IP addresses.
V. PROTOTYPE, AND ITS PERFORMANCE
For simplicity, we have built our prototype using Python
and gRPC5, and only use C (via cffi6) for the most important
cryptographic operations.
The flowrate our prototype can handle, while perhaps the
most important performance characteristic, is also rather diffi-
cult to pin down, as it depends on the type of traffic: 100 Mbit
of conference calls poses less of a challenge than 100 Mbit
of DNS requests and answers, as the latter results in more
individual flows. But, if those DNS requests all go to the same
resolver and thus the same IP address, the caching mechanism
will have a higher cache hit rate, which is beneficial again
in terms of the how many flows the system can process in
a certain time frame. The feasibility of running the PEP3
system online and keeping up with processing the actual
traffic therefore depends on the nature the traffic on that very
network.
What we can say with confidence is that throughput is
limited primarily by the number of unique IP addresses that
appear in the flows, since each one of those IP addresses needs
to be encrypted by the metering process, then translated with
the help of at least three peers, and finally decrypted by the
storage facility. Indeed, these three cryptographic operations,
(1), (2), and (3), alone, account for more than 75% of process
time of our prototype. The remaining 25% is finely divided
over matters such as networking, TLS, the database engine,
scheduling, random numbers generation, and so on.
The time the three main operations take is in turn primarily
determined by the number of scalar multiplications involved:
each operation of the form s ·M where s ∈ Z/ℓZ andM ∈ G,
takes about 125 µs on our 2 GHz i7-4750HQ processor. Scal-
ing the basepoint, B, is significantly cheaper, costing 45µs.
Encryption, (1), takes one general scalar multiplication (rτ ),
and one basepoint scaling (rB), while decryption (2) takes
only one scalar multiplication sβ. In general a translation, (3),
requires one basepoint and four general scalar multiplications,
but since in our setting the target is fixed (being the storage
facility), we need one fewer scalar multiplication.
Hence, processing one IP address should take at least 1.6ms
(based on 11 scalar multiplications, and 4 base scalings,) but
since more than just scaling is involved such as (un)packing
5https://grpc.github.io
6https://cffi.readthedocs.io/en/latest/
points and scalars, we see in benchmarks a cost of 2.3ms per
IP address for the three main operations, and 3ms in total, as
our prototype processes 20 000 unique IP addresses per minute
on our quad core.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have described PEP3, a system for pseudonymising IP
flow data built on curve25519 via the ristretto255 group G. An
important feature of PEP3 is a robust transcryptor (consisting
of five peers) that functions even when two peers act dishon-
estly. Moreover, the peers do not learn the pseudonyms they
process, and the the peers’ actions can be verified. We also
showed how to map IP addresses to G by a for-all-practical-
purposes reversible method (using elligator2). Concerning
future research, PEP3 would benefit greatly from an improved
way to generate its secrets that cannot be disrupted by an
anonymous peer. Moreover, it would be interesting to see if
the flow-based intrusion detection system SSHCure[22] could
run against PEP3.
On the more practical side, the next order of business for us
is to load test our internal prototype of PEP3 by connecting
it to a router generating flow data. We expect this experiment
leads to several adjustments to PEP3.
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